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Abstract
This paper integrates research in robot programming and rea-
soning about action with research in model-based reasoning
about physical systems to provide a new capability for model-
based reasoning systems, which we term model-based pro-
gramming. Model-based programs are reusable high-level
programs that capture the procedural knowledge of how to
accomplish a task, without specifying all the system-speciﬁc
details. Model-based programs must be instantiated in the
context of a model of a speciﬁc system/device and state of
the world. The instantiated programs are simply sequences
of actions, which can be performed by an appropriate agent
to control the behavior of the system. The separation of con-
trol and model enables reuse of model-based programs for
devices whose conﬁguration changes as the result of replace-
ment, redesign, reconﬁguration or component failure. Addi-
tionally, the logical formalism underlying model-based pro-
gramming enables veriﬁcation of properties such as safety,
program existence, and goal achievement. Our model-based
programs are realized by exploiting research on the logic pro-
gramming language Golog, together with research on repre-
senting actions and state constraints in the situation calculus,
and modeling physical systems using state constraints.
1 Introduction
Much of the research in model-based reasoning about
complex physical systems has aimed to combine a task-
independent, declarative representation of the behaviour of
somephysicalsystem, suchas a circuitoran electromechan-
ical device,with a set oftask-speciﬁcreasoningmechanisms
(e.g., abductive reasoning, consistency-based reasoning) in
order to perform a particular task such as diagnosis. The
models1 oftencapturethebehaviorandstructureofthephys-
ical system and are commonly represented as a set of state
constraints.
One virtue of the model-based approach is ease of mod-
iﬁcation and reuse. Unlike its precursor, the expert system,
model-based reasoning systems enable a model of the de-
vice to be created once for multiple applications, and since
the representations are declarative, they are easily modiﬁed.
An arguable shortcoming of typical model-based reasoning
1Throughout this paper, the term model is used in the model-
based reasoning or engineering sense, not in the semantic sense,
unless otherwise noted.
systems is that their declarative representations do not en-
able easy representation of the procedural knowledge and
heuristics of experts on how to perform a particular task.
In this paper, we are motivated by a growing class of
physical systems that have received less attention from the
model-based reasoning community – the class of complex
physical systems that are controlled by a human operator,
or by an embedded controller. The question we pose our-
selves is: How can we exploit rich declarative models to
facilitate programming complex physical systems, maintain-
ing the virtues of a model-based approach, while address-
ing its shortcomings with respect to representing procedural
knowledge. We answer this question by integratingresearch
from robot programming and reasoning about action with
research in model-based reasoning about complex physical
systems.
Themaincontributionofthis paperis to providea newca-
pability to the model-based reasoning community – model-
based programming2 Model-based programs are reusable
high-level programs that capture the procedural knowledge
of how to accomplish a task, without specifying all the
system-speciﬁc details. They are called model-based be-
cause, on their own, they are too abstract to be executed.
They must be instantiated in the context of a model of a spe-
ciﬁc system/device and state of the world. The instantiated
programs are simply sequences of actions, which can sub-
sequently be performed by an appropriate agent to control
the behavior of the system. This separation of control and
model within model-based programming enables reuse of
model-based programs for devices whose conﬁguration and
hence models changes as the result of e.g., device replace-
ment,redesign,reconﬁgurationordevicecomponentfailure.
Topositionourmodel-basedprogrammingwork,it is also
worthwhile to discuss what model-based programming is
not. Model-based programming is not deductive program
synthesis(e.g., (Smith& Green1996),(Manna& Waldinger
1987)), nor is it model-based program synthesis from soft-
ware reuse libraries (e.g., (Stickel et al. 1994)). Whereas
deductive program synthesis uses deductive machinery to
synthesizea programfroma speciﬁcation,model-basedpro-
2The term model-based programming did not originate with us.
E.g., (Williams & Nayak 1996), (Stickel et al. 1994), etc. each use
the term with different meanings from ours.gramming starts with a program, and uses models and de-
ductive machinery to simply ﬁll in some details. Model-
based programming is also not the derivation of decision
trees from models (e.g., (Price et al. 1996)). One can view
the generation of decision trees from models as inducing
some sort of procedural knowledge relating to a task, but
these “procedures” are system induced as opposed to user-
deﬁned; they are speciﬁc to the one model used to gener-
ate them; and they lacks the structure provided by model-
based programming language constructs. Finally, model-
based programming is not planning. There is some relation-
ship to planning which we will discuss in this paper, but a
model-basedprogramis truly a programcompletewith typi-
cal program structure such as while loops and if-then-else’s.
In (McIlraith 1998) we presented some very preliminary
thoughts on using the situation calculus to develop generic
procedures for model-based computing. Here we provide
a much richer development of the related idea of model-
based programming including discussion of how to verify
properties of programs within our formalism. In this pa-
per, we argue that the situation calculus and the logic pro-
gramming Golog together provide a natural formalism for
model-based programming. We take as our starting point
two separate entities: a set of state constraints in ﬁrst-order
logic, that can describe the structure and behavior of a phys-
ical system; and a set of actions. In Section 2.1 we appeal
to a solution to the frame and ramiﬁcation problems in the
situation calculus in order to provide an integrated repre-
sentation of our physical device and the actions that affect
it. This representation scheme is the critical enabler of our
model-basedprogrammingcapability. With a representation
for our models in hand, Section 2.2 introduces the notion
of a model-based program, shows how to exploit Golog to
specify model-based programs, and shows how to generate
program instances from the program and the model using
deductive machinery. In control applications, it is often de-
sirable tobe able to provepropertiesofprograms. InSection
3 we show how the logical formalism underlying model-
based programming enables veriﬁcation of properties such
as safety, program existence, and goal achievement. We
conclude with a brief discussion of experimentation, related
work, discussion and summary.
2 Model-Based Programming
Model-based programming comprises two components:
A Model whichprovidesanintegratedrepresentationofthe
structureandbehaviorofthecomplexphysicalsystembe-
ing programmed, the operator or controller actions that
affect it, and the state of the system. The model dictates
the language for the program.
A Program which describes the high-level procedure for
performingsome task, using the operatoror controllerac-
tions.
2.1 The Model
The ﬁrst step towards achieving our vision of model-based
programming is to ﬁnd a suitable representation for our
models. Inthis sectionwe demonstratethat the situation cal-
culus will provide a suitable language for this task. Model-
based reasoning often represents the structure and behavior
of physical systems as a set of state constraints in ﬁrst-order
logic. Theﬁrstchallengewemustaddressis howtointegrate
operator or controller actions into our representation, in or-
der to obtain an integrated representation of our system. To
do so, we appeal to a solution to the frame and ramiﬁcation
problems proposed in (McIlraith 1997), that automatically
compiles a situation calculus theory of action with a a set
of state constraints. We begin with a brief overview of the
situation calculus.
2.1.1 The Situation Calculus
The situation calculus language we employ to axiomatize
our domains is a sorted ﬁrst-order language with equality.
The sorts are of type
￿
for primitive actions,
￿ for situa-
tions,
￿ for ﬂuents, and
￿ for everythingelse, includingdo-
main objects ((Lin & Reiter 1994), (Reiter 1998)). We rep-
resent each action as a (possibly parameterized) ﬁrst-class
object within the language. Situations are simply sequences
of actions. The evolution of the world can be viewed as
a tree rooted at the distinguished initial situation
￿
￿
￿ . The
branches of the tree are determined by the possible future
situations that could arise from the realization of particu-
lar sequences of actions. As such, each situation along
the tree is simply a history of the sequence of actions per-
formed to reach it. The function symbol
￿
￿
￿ maps an ac-
tion term and a situation term into a new situation term.
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set of the situation tree consisting of situations that are pos-
sible in the world. Finally, those properties or relations
whose truth value can change from situation to situation are
referred to as ﬂuents. For example, the property that the
pump is on in situation
! could be represented by the ﬂuent
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￿ . The situation calculus language we employ in
this paper is restricted to primitive, determinate actions. For
the present, our language does not include a representation
of time or concurrency.
2.1.2 The Representation Scheme
Our representation scheme automatically integrates a set of
state constraints, such as the ones found in a typical model-
based diagnosis system description,
*
,
+ (de Kleer, Mack-
worth, & Reiter 1992) with a situation calculus theory of ac-
tiontoprovideacompiledrepresentationscheme. We sketch
the integrationprocedurein sufﬁcient detail to be replicated.
We illustrate it in terms of an exampleof a powerplant feed-
water system.
The system consists of three potentially malfunctioning
components: a power supply (
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￿ ), which in turn provideswater to the boiler,
producing steam. Alternately, the header can be ﬁlled man-ually (
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1 ). To make the example more interesting,
we take liberty with the functioningof the actual system and
assume that once water is entering the header, a siphon is
created. Water will only stop entering the header when the
siphon is stopped. The system also contains lights and an
alarm, and it contains people. The plant is occupied at all
times unless it is explicitly evacuated. Finally we have stip-
ulatedcertain componentsof the plantas vital. Such compo-
nents should not be turned off in the event of an emergency.
Boiler
Power
Pump Head Steam
Lights
Alarm
Power Plant Feedwater System
Thissystemistypicallyaxiomatizedintermsofasetofstate
constraints. The following is a representative subset.3
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We also have a situation calculus action theory. One com-
ponent of our theory of action is a set of effect axioms that
describe the effects on our power plant of actions performed
by the system, a human or nature. The effect axioms take
the following general form:
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The following are typical effect axioms.
￿
￿
￿
"
!
￿
!
#
￿
%
$
&
￿
’
!
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
/
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
%
$
&
￿
!
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
!
(
!
#
￿
%
$
&
￿
’
!
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
<
;
1
2
￿
;
1
2
￿
-
￿
￿
0
￿
￿
0
/
1
2
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
%
$
&
￿
!
￿
￿
￿
In addition to effect axioms our theory also has a set of
necessaryconditionsforactionswhichareofthefollowing
general form:
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These axioms say that if it is possible to perform action
!
in
situation
￿
thencertainconditions(so-callednec conditions)
must hold in that situation.
3Note that for simplicity, this particular set of state constraints
violates the no-function-in-structure philosophy. This characteris-
tic is not in any way essential to our representation.
The following are typical necessary conditions for actions.
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We now have axioms describing the constraints on the sys-
tem state, and also axioms describing the actions that affect
system state. Unfortunately,these axiomson their own yield
unintendedinterpretations. Thatis, there areunintended(se-
mantic) models of this theory. This happens because there
are several assumptions that we hold about the theory that
have not been made explicit. In particular,
Completeness Assumption: we assume that the axioma-
tizer has done his/her job properly and that the state con-
straints, effect axioms and necessary conditions for ac-
tions capture all the elements that can affect our system.
Causal Structure: we assume a particular causal structure
thatlets us interprethow theactions interactwith ourstate
constraints, i.e. how effects are propagated through the
system,andwhatstate constraintsprecludeanactionfrom
being performed. The causal structure must be acyclic.
We make these assumptions explicit and compile our as-
sumptions, state constraints and theory of action into a ﬁ-
nal model-based representation. The compilation process
is semantically justiﬁed and further described in (McIlraith
1997).
Completeness
 Assumption
 Causal
Structure  
Effect Axioms &
Nec. Conds Actions
         
Successor
State
Axioms
Compiler
      Multiple
(Logical) Models
      Unique 
Intended Model
State
Constraints
Action
Precondition
Axioms
The Compilation Process
Theresultingexampleaxiomatizationisprovidedbelow. We
will referto this collectionof axioms as a situation calculus
domain axiomatization. It comprises:
> successor state axioms,
> action precondition axioms,
> axioms describing the initial situation,
*
@
? ,
> unique names for actions and domain closure axioms
for actions (not included), and
> the foundational axioms of the situation calculus which
are domain independent (not included) (Reiter 1998).
The ﬁrst element of the domain axiomatizationafter com-
pilationis the set ofsuccessor stateaxioms. Successor state
axioms are of the following general form.
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a state constraint made it true
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it was already true
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neither an action nor a state constraint
made it false]I.e., if it is possible to perform action
!
in situation
￿
, then
(
+
*
-
,
+
.
%
/
￿
0 will be true in the resulting situation if and only if
an action made it true, a state constraint made it true, or it
was already true and neither an action nor a state constraint
made it false.
Here is the complete set of successor state axioms for our
example.
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Observe that these successor state axioms can be further
compiled by substituting successor state axioms for ﬂuents
relativized to situation
4
 
￿
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. For example, among other
axioms, Axiom (5) could be substituted into Axiom (4).
In addition to the successor state axioms there is a set of
action precondition axioms that capture the necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for actions. They are of the form:
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Our axiomatization will have some knowledge regarding
the initial situation of the world. This will include what is
knownof the truth value of predicates and ﬂuents relativized
to
*
+
? , for example:
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It will also include the state constraints relativized to the
initial situation. We repeat only a few here for illustration
purposes.
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We have demonstratedthat the situation calculus provides
a suitable representation for the model-based programming
models.
Deﬁnition 1 (Model) A model-based programming model,
￿
is a situation calculus domain axiomatization on the sit-
uation calculus language
￿ .
We henceforthrefer to the model of our power plant feed-
water example as
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.2.2 The Program
With the critical model representationin hand, we must now
ﬁnd a suitable representationfor our model-basedprograms.
Further, we must ﬁnd a suitable mechanism for instantiat-
ing our model-based program with respect to our models.
We argue that the logic programming language, Golog and
theorem proving provide a natural formalism for this task.
In the subsection to follow, we introduce the Golog logic
programminglanguage and its exploitation for model-based
programming.
2.2.1 Golog
Golog is a high-level logic programming language devel-
oped at the University of Toronto (Levesqueet al. 1997). Its
primary use is for robot programming and to support high-
level robot task planning (e.g., (Burgard et al. 1998)), but
is has also been used for agent-based programming (e.g.,
meeting scheduling). Golog provides a set of extralogical
constructs for assembling primitive actions deﬁned in the
situation calculus (e.g.,
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our power plant example) into macros that can be viewed
as complex actions, and that assemble into a program.
In the context of our model-based representation, we can
deﬁne a set of macros that is relevant to our domain or to
a family of systems in our domain. The instruction set for
these macros, the primitive actions, are simply the domain-
speciﬁc primitiveactionsofourmodel-basedrepresentation.
Hence, themacrosor complexactionssimplyreduceto ﬁrst-
order (and occasionally second-order) formulae in our sit-
uation calculus language. The following are examples of
Golog statements.
if AB(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
) then PMP FIX endIf
while
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
￿
/
@
.
2
/
￿
0
$
:
9
ON(
￿
:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
/
@
.
%
/
￿
0 ) do
TURN OFF(
￿
:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
/
@
.
%
/
￿
0 )
endWhile
proc PREVENTDANGER
if OCCUPIED then EVACUATE endIf
endProc
We leave detailed discussion of Golog to (Levesque et al.
1997) and simply describe the constructs for the Golog lan-
guage. Let
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ be complex action expressions and let
￿
and
!
be so-called pseudo ﬂuents/actions, respectively,
i.e., a ﬂuent/action in the language of the situation calculus
with all its situation arguments suppressed.
primitive action
!
test of truth
￿
￿
￿
sequence
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
$
nondeterministic choice between actions
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
$
nondeterministic choice of arguments
￿
3
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￿
nondeterministic iteration
￿
￿
￿
conditional if
￿
then
￿
￿
else
￿
￿
loop while
￿
do
￿
procedure proc
￿
￿
1
 
$
￿ end
A Golog program is in turn comprised of a sequence of
procedures.
Each of the programming constructs listed above is sim-
ply a macro, equivalent to a situation calculus formula.
Golog also deﬁnes the abbreviation
+
￿
6
￿
￿
"
￿
￿
5
"
￿
￿
"
!
￿
$
. It says that
+
￿
6
￿
￿
"
￿
￿
5
"
￿
￿
!
$
holds whenever
￿
!
is a terminating situation fol-
lowing the execution of complex action
￿ , starting in situa-
tion
￿
. Each of the programming constructs listed above is
simply a macro, equivalent to a situation calculus formula.
+
￿
is deﬁned for each complex action construct. Three
are deﬁned below.
+
￿
6
￿
￿
!
#
"
￿
￿
5
"
￿
￿
!
$
9
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
!
A
￿
%
$
"
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
&
￿
!
#
4
 
￿
6
￿
￿
!
A
￿
%
$
"
￿
￿
￿
$ 4
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￿
6
￿
A
￿
&
￿
￿
￿
’
￿
$
"
￿
￿
5
"
￿
￿
!
$
9
#
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￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
$
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￿
+
￿
6
￿
￿
&
￿
"
￿
￿
5
"
￿
￿
￿
$
@
&
+
￿
6
￿
￿
￿
￿
"
￿
￿
￿
"
￿
￿
!
$
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$
+
￿
6
￿
C
￿
￿
3
$
￿
￿
3
$
"
￿
￿
"
￿
￿
!
$
9
#
￿
￿
￿
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$
9
+
￿
6
￿
￿
￿
3
$
:
"
￿
￿
5
"
￿
￿
!
$
Deﬁnitionsoftherest ofthecomplexactionscanbefound
in (Levesqueet al. 1997)but their meaningshould be appar-
ent from the examples below. Before returning to our exam-
ple, we deﬁne what we mean by a model-based program.
Deﬁnition 2 (Model-Based Program,
￿ for model
￿
)
Given a model
￿
in situation calculus language
￿ ,
￿ is a
model-basedprogram for model
￿
iff
￿ is a Golog program
that only mentions pseudo actions and pseudo ﬂuents drawn
from
￿ .
We begin by deﬁning a rather simple looking procedure
to illustrate the constructs in our language and to illustrate
the range of procedures Golog can instantiate with respect
to the example model,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
proc SHUTDOWN
(
￿
3
$
[VITAL
￿
3
$
E
OFF
￿
3
$
]?
￿
￿
￿
3
$
[[ON
￿
3
$
&
*
)
VITAL
￿
3
$
]?; TURNOFF
￿
3
$
];
SHUTDOWN
endProc
The procedure SHUTDOWN directs the agent to turn off
everything that isn’t vital. If it is not the case that either ev-
erythingis offorelse it is vital, thenpicka randomthingthat
is on and that is not vital, turn it off and repeat the procedure
until everything is either off or else it is vital.
From the simple procedures deﬁned above, we can
deﬁne the following model-based program that dictates a
procedure for addressing an abnormal boiler.
if AB(
￿
*
+
￿ ) then
PREVENTDANGER; SHUTDOWN; BLR FIX; RESTART5
end if (33)
4Notation:
$
￿
!
￿ denotes the restoration of the situation argu-
ments to any functional ﬂuents mentioned by the action term
$ .
5Procedure not deﬁned here.This program on its own is very simple and seems unin-
teresting since it exploits little domain knowledge and thus
doesn’t capture many of the idiosyncrasies of the system.
Instead, it illustrates the beauty of model-based program-
ming. By using nondeterministic choice, the program need
not stipulate which componentto turn off ﬁrst, but if there is
a physical requirementto turn one componentoff before an-
other, then it will be dictated in the model,
￿
of the speciﬁc
system, and when the model-based program is instantiated,
￿
will ensure that the instantiation of the program enforces
this ordering. This use of nondeterminism and exploitation
of the model makes the program reusable for multiple dif-
ferent devices without the need to rewrite the program. It
also saves the engineer/programmerfrom being mired in the
details of the physical constraints of a potentially complex
speciﬁc system.
It is important to observe that model-based programs are
not programs in the conventionalsense. While they have the
complex structure of programs, including loops, if-then-else
statements etc., they differ in that they are not necessarily
deterministic. As such they run the gamut from playing the
roleof a procedurallyspeciﬁed plansketchthat helpsto con-
strain the search space required in planning, to the other ex-
treme where the model-based program provides a determin-
istic sequence of actions, much in the way a traditional pro-
gram might. Unfortunately, planning is hard, particularly in
cases where we have incomplete knowledge. Computation-
ally, in the worst-case, a model-based program will further
constrain the search space, helping the search engines hone
in on a suitable sequence of actions to achieve the objective
of the program. In the best place, it will dictate a determin-
istic sequence of actions.
Indeed, what is interesting and unique about Golog pro-
gramsandwhat makesthemidealformodel-basedprogram-
ming, is how they are instantiated with respect to a model.
Deﬁnition 3 (Model-Based Program Instance,
1
￿
)
1
￿
is a
model-based program instance of model
￿
and model-
based program
￿ iff
1
￿
is a sequence of actions
A
!
￿
"
9
2
9
9
@
"
￿
!
￿
￿
$
such that
￿
￿
#
+
￿
6
￿
￿
"
*
+
?
"
￿
4
5
￿
6
￿
A
!
￿
￿
"
2
9
9
2
9
@
"
C
!
￿
￿
$
"
*
+
?
$
C
$
9
Recall that the program itself is simply a macro for one
or more situation calculus formulae. Hence, generation of
a program instance can be achieved by theorem proving, in
particular,bytryingtoprove
￿
￿
￿
￿
!
$
9
+
￿
6
￿
￿
"
*
+
?
"
￿
￿
!
$
frommodel
￿
. The sequence of actions,
A
!
￿
￿
5
"
9
2
9
9
￿
"
C
!
￿
$
constituting the
program instance can be extracted from the binding for
￿
!
in
the proof. We cansee that in this context,the instantiationof
amodel-basedprogramis relatedto deductiveplansynthesis
(Green 1969).
Returning to our example, instantiating the model-based
program (33) with respect to our example model
￿
￿
￿
,
which includes some constraints on the initial situation
*
?
as deﬁned in Axioms (21)–(26), terminates at the situation
4
 
￿
6
￿
.
 
!
￿
,
!
0
.
"
*
+
?
$
. Consequently, the model-based program
instance is composedof the single action
.
 
!
￿
,
!
0
. . (All the
other components of the system are off in the initial situa-
tion.) If the initial situation were changed so that all compo-
nents that could be on at the same time were on, the proofof
the program might return the terminating situation
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￿
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￿
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#
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thus yielding the model-based program instance
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￿
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To illustrate the power of Golog as a model-based pro-
gramming language, imagine that our system is more com-
plex than the one described by
￿
￿
￿
, that the pump must
be turned off after the boiler, and that before the boiler is
turned off that there are valves that must be turned off. If
this knowledge is contained in the model
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , then this
same simple model-based program, (33) is still applicable,
but its instantiation will be different. In particular, to instan-
tiate this model-basedprogram,the theoremproverwill pick
a random nonvital component to turn off, but the precondi-
tions to turn off that component may not be true, if so it will
pick another, and another until it ﬁnally ﬁnds the correct se-
quence of actions that constitutes a proof, and hence a legal
action sequence.
Inthis instance, an alternativeto SHUTDOWN wouldbe to
exploit the knowledge of an expert familiar with the system,
and to write a system-speciﬁc shutdown procedure, along
the lines of the following, that captures at least some of this
system-speciﬁc procedural knowledge.
proc NEWSHUTDOWN
SHUTVALVES;
TURNOFF
￿
￿
￿
*
￿
￿
$
;TURNOFF
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
$
;TURNOFF
￿
￿
*
!
￿
￿
$
endProc
proc SHUTVALVES
(
￿
3
$
[VALVE
￿
3
$
’ OFF
￿
3
$
]?
￿
￿
￿
3
$
[[VALVE
￿
3
$
￿
&
)
ON
￿
3
$
]?; TURNOFF
￿
3
$
];
SHUTVALVES
endProc
Indeed,in this particularexample,writing such a program
is viable, and NEWSHUTDOWN captures the expertiseof the
expert and in so doing, makes the the model-based instanti-
ation process more efﬁcient. Nevertheless, with a complex
physicalsystem comprisedof hundredsof complexinteract-
ing components, correct sequencing of a shutdown proce-
dure may be better left to a theorem prover following the
complex constraints dictated in the model, rather than ex-
pecting a control engineer to recall all the complex interde-
pendencies of the system.
This last example serves to illustrate that model-based
programs can reside along a continuum from being under-
constrained articulations of the goal of a task, to being a
deterministic program for achieving that goal. SHUTDOWN
is situated closer to the goal end of the spectrum, whereas
NEWSHUTDOWN is closer towardsa deterministicprogram.
3 Proving Properties of Programs
It is often desirable to be able to enforce and/or prove cer-
tain formal properties of programs. In our model-based pro-
gramming paradigm, we may wish to verify properities of amodel-based program we have written or of a program in-
stance we have generated. We may also wish to experiment
with the behavior of our model-based program by modify-
ing aspects of our model
￿
and seeing what effect it has on
program properties. A special case of this, is modifying the
initial situation
*
￿
? . Finally, rather than verifying properties,
we may wish to actually generate program instances which
enforce certain properties. Since our model-based programs
are simply macros for logical expressions, our programming
paradigm immediately lends itself to this task.
An important ﬁrst property to prove is that a program in-
stance actually exists for a particular model-based program
and model. This proposition also shows that the program
terminates (Levesque et al. 1997).
Proposition 1 (Program Instance Existence) A program
instance exists for model-based program
￿ and model
￿
iff
￿
￿
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
$
9
+
￿
6
￿
￿
"
*
+
?
"
￿
￿
￿
$
9
Another interesting property is safety. Engineers who write
control procedures often wish to verify that the trajectories
generated by their control procedures do not pass through
unsafe states, i.e., states where some safety property
￿
does
not hold.
Proposition 2 (Program Instance Safety) Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
$
be a
ﬁrst-order formula representing the safety property. A pro-
gram instance,
1
￿
#
A
!
￿
"
2
9
9
2
9
￿
"
C
!
￿
￿
$
of model-based program
￿ and model
￿
enforces safety property
￿
￿
￿
￿
$
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￿
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By a simple variation on the above proposition, we can
prove several stronger safety properties. For example, we
can prove that a model-based program enforces the safety
property for every potential program instance.
Proposition 3 (Program Safety) Let
￿
￿
7
￿
￿
$
be a ﬁrst-order
formula representing the safety property. A model-based
program,
￿ and model
￿
enforce safety property
￿
￿
7
￿
￿
$
iff
￿
￿
#
￿
(
￿
￿
$
9
+
￿
6
￿
￿
"
*
+
?
"
￿
￿
￿
$
’
￿
￿
1
￿
"
*
+
?
$
"
where for each situation variable
￿
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￿
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￿
A
￿
￿
"
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9
9
￿
"
￿
￿
￿
$
"
*
+
?
$
,
1
￿
#
A
￿
￿
"
9
9
2
9
￿
"
￿
￿
￿
$
.
A ﬁnal property we wish to examine is goal achievement.
Since our model-based programs are designed with some
task in mind, we may wish to prove that when the program
has terminated execution, it will have achieved the desired
goal.
Proposition 4 (Program Instance Goal Achievement)
Let
￿
￿
7
￿
￿
$
be a ﬁrst-order formula representing the
goal of model-based program
￿ . A program instance,
1
￿
#
A
!
￿
"
9
9
2
9
￿
"
C
!
￿
￿
$
of model-based program,
￿ and model
￿
achieves the goal
￿
￿
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￿
￿
$
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￿
￿
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Again, by a simple variation on the above proposition,
we can prove several other properties with respect to goal
achievement. For example, we can provethat a model-based
program is guaranteed to achieve its goal for every potential
program instance.
Proposition 5 (Program Goal Achievement) Let
￿
￿
7
￿
￿
$
be
a ﬁrst-order formula representing the goal of model-based
program
￿ .
￿ and model
￿
are guaranteed to achieve goal
￿
￿
7
￿
￿
$
iff
￿
￿
#
￿
(
￿
%
$
:
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￿
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￿
"
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?
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￿
￿
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$
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￿
￿
7
￿
￿
$
:
9
There are many variants on these and other propositions,
regarding properties of programs. For example, up until
now, we have assumed that we have a ﬁxed initial situa-
tion
*
￿
? , whose state is captured in our model,
￿
. We can
strengthen many of the above propositions by rejecting this
assumption and proving Propositions 1, 3, 5 for any initial
situation. This can be done by replacing
*
? by initial situa-
tion variable
￿
? and by quantifying,not only over
￿
, but uni-
versally quantifying over
￿
? . Clearly, many programs will
not enable the proof of properities for all initial situations,
but the associated propositions still hold.
Finally, exploiting Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, it is
trivial to see how we can use theorem proving to generate
a model-based program instance
1
￿
that enforces the safety
conditionand/orachieves the programgoal, rather than gen-
erating a model-based program instance and then verifying
that it enforces/achieves certain properties. The sequence of
actions comprising
1
￿
will simply be the bindingsfor the ter-
minating situation
￿
￿
4
 
￿
6
￿
1
￿
"
*
￿
?
$
8
$
. This said, we note that if
we have used Propositions 3 and 5 to show that all program
instances of th model-basedprogramenforce the safety con-
dition and achieve the goal, then there is no need to stipulate
these conditions when subsequently generating a program
instance.
4 Related Work
The work presented here is related to several different re-
search areas. In particular, this research is related in spirit
only to work on plan sketches such as (Myers 1997). In
contrast, plan sketches are instantiated through hierarchical
substitution. Further, plan sketches generally don’t exploit
the procedural programming language constructs found in
our model-based programminglanguage. Model-based pro-
gramming is also related in spirit to various types of pro-
gramsynthesisandmodel-basedsoftwarereuse(e.g.,(Smith
& Green 1996), (Manna & Waldinger 1987), (Stickel et al.
1994))andtomodel-basedgenerationofdecisiontrees (e.g.,
(Price et al. 1996)). We refer the reader back to Section 1
for a discussion of the relationship. As noted in Section 2.2,
model-based programming is also related to deductive plan
synthesis (e.g., (Green 1969)),since this providespart of the
mechanism for program instantiation.
Needless to say, model-based programming is intimately
related to cognitiverobotics, agent-basedprogramming,and
robot programming, particularly in Golog. This work drew
heavily from the research on Golog. A major distinction
in our work has been the challenge of dealing with largenumbers of state constraints inherent to the representation
of complex physical systems, and the desire to prove certain
properties of our programs. In the ﬁrst regard, our work is
related to ongoingwork at NASA on immobots(Williams &
Nayak 1996), and in particular to research charged with de-
veloping a model-based executive such as has recently been
initiated by (Williams & Gupta 1999).
Finally, this work is related to controller synthesis and
controller programming from the engineering community.
Comments on the distinction between model-based pro-
gramming and program synthesis also hold for controller
synthesis. With respect to controller programming, typical
controller programming languages do not separate control
from models. Hence, programs are system speciﬁc and not
model based. As a consequence they are harder to write,
much more brittle, and are not amenable to reuse.
5 Summary and Discussion
This papersynthesizes several subﬁelds of AI, exploitingre-
search in robot programming, reasoning about action, and
model-basedreasoningaboutphysicalsystems. Theparticu-
lar class ofphysicalsystems drivingthis research is the class
of systems that are controlled by an external agent such as
a human or an embedded controller. The question we posed
to ourselves was how we could exploit the beneﬁts of rich
declarative models, which have been used with great suc-
cess in other aspects of model-based reasoning, to actually
program physical devices. Clearly model-based program-
ming supports programming a variety of tasks related to the
diagnosis, control, maintenace and reconﬁguration of phys-
ical systems. With the very recent exception of (Williams &
Gupta 1999), none of the research on model-based reason-
ing about physical systems has addressed this issue. In that
regard, this work is an important step.
The main contribution of this paper was to propose and
provide a new capability for model-based reasoning about
physical systems – model-based programming. Speciﬁ-
cally: we envisaged the concept of model-based program-
ming; proposed a representation and compilation procedure
to create suitable models of physical systems in the situa-
tion calculus; proposed and demonstrated the effectiveness
of Golog for expressing model-based programs themselves;
and proposed theorem proving as a model-based program
instantiation mechanism. We also provided a set of propo-
sitions that characterized interesting properties of programs
that could be veriﬁed or enforced within our model-based
programming framework.
The merits of model-based programming come from the
exploitation of models of system behavior and from the sep-
aration of those models from high-level procedural knowl-
edge about how to perform a task. Model-based programs
are written at a sufﬁciently high level of abstraction that
they are very amenable to reuse. Also, they are easier to
write than traditional control programs, ridding the engi-
neer/programmer of keeping track of the potentially com-
plex details of a system design, with all its subcomponent
interactions. Further, because of the logical foundations of
model-based programming, important properties of model-
based programs such as safety, program existence and goal
achievement can be veriﬁed, and/or simply enforced in the
generation of program instances.
Thereare severalweaknesses to ourapproachat this time.
We hope to address some of these in future research. The
ﬁrst is inherent in Golog – not all complex actions compris-
ing our Golog programming language are ﬁrst-order deﬁn-
able. Hence, in its general form, our model-based program-
ming language is second order. However, as observed by
(Levesque et al. 1997) and experienced by the authors, ﬁrst
order is adequate for most purposes. The second problem is
that the Prolog implementation of Golog relies on a closed-
worldassumption(CWA) whichhas suitedourpurposes,but
is nota validassumptionin the generalcase. We have exper-
imented with several applications, including a furnace leak
test system (Probst 1996). Finally, not all physical system
behavior can be expressed as logical state constraints. This
is a weakness of our current model representation. We will
need to extend our model representationlanguageto include
ODE’s. We will do so by exploiting related work in the sit-
uation calculus (Pinto 1994).
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